Heron's Eye: 10/08/08

Unions and MPs back 'dream ticket'
A powerful coalition of mainstream Labour MPs and leaders of Britain's biggest unions is backing a right-left 'dream ticket' of Alan Johnson and Jon Cruddas to lead the party into the next general election, having given up on Gordon Brown's premiership. [Guardian]

Rise up to curb knife culture, PM urges at book festival
Gordon Brown called yesterday for communities across Britain to 'rise up' and help end the spiralling violence of knife crime by making the carrying of weapons socially unacceptable. [Guardian]

Darling backs away from stamp duty cut
The chancellor, Alistair Darling, is prepared to disappoint millions of would-be home buyers by ruling out proposals to revive the housing market, Treasury insiders warned last night. After a chaotic week of claim and counter-claim about Treasury plans to suspend stamp duty for first-time buyers, Darling has hardened his stance against the move, which he believes could cost billions to little positive effect. [Guardian]

The perfect Sunday menu: grilled minister, or something over easy?
After last month's final edition of ITV's The Sunday Programme, its weekly early morning current affairs show, the channel that once produced Weekend World and Walden was left without any specifically political output. It scrapped The Sunday Edition, co-hosted by The Observer's Andrew Rawnsley, at the end of last year, leaving the BBC, which has to cover Westminster under the terms of its licence fee, as the only major broadcaster to offer extensive political coverage. [Guardian]

Rich-poor education gap wider under Labour, claim Tories
The Conservatives today set out their credentials to become the champions of social equality in a document outlining the education gap between rich and poor, which they claim has widened under the Labour government. [Guardian]

A Lib Dem tax revolution?
Michael White analyses Nick Clegg’s party leadership and his new direction for the Lib Dem’s tax policy. [Guardian]

Scramble for tickets to Tory conference
The Tories have begun planning for a record-breaking party conference this autumn which will aim to portray David Cameron as a statesmanlike future leader amid signs that the political and corporate establishment is shifting toward the Conservatives. [Guardian]

Transport: London still gridlocked despite congestion charge
The London congestion charge is losing its battle against gridlock after it was revealed that the capital's streets are as gridlocked now as they were before the levy was introduced. [Guardian]

Labour to offer 'birth to school' childcare
Parents could be offered a seamless system of state-organised childcare from birth to school under proposals being discussed within the government in the battle to win parents' votes. [Guardian]

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In The Loop: 01/08/08

John Hutton “disappointed” at EDF failure

Mr Hutton commented on the failure EDF and British Energy to agree a deal, saying that he was "disappointed". [PolitcsHome]

Conditions for a rebalanced economy

Samuel Brittan writes in the FT on the need for some perspective on the state of the current economy. He highlights the size of the financial market in the UK (12%) and how growth is not as low as people suggest, pointing towards the still high levels of growth in many developing economies. [FT]

A symbolic nutcracker will not solve the crunch

Stuart Fraser, chairman of the policy and resources committee, City of London Corporation on the need for the EU commissioner, Charlie McCreevy to display more caution in responding to the credit crunch. [FT]

Government and Web 2.0

The Government has launched BuildingDemocracy.co.uk, combined with £150,000 for the top ten ideas submitted on how to strengthen democracy in the UK. [LabourOutlook]

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How Do Their Attitudes Towards Founding And History Affect Different Democracies?

This essay aims to compare how democracies are affected from a revolutionary aspect, such as when democracies were founded and then from an evolutionary aspect, where events result in a shift in democratic structure. It will focus on France and the United States of America, two of the earliest modern democracies, which were created in the eighteenth century and greatly informed by their differing histories of political upheaval and revolution. In order to make these cases the nature of the uprisings in the eighteenth century, their alternative effects shall be looked at, as well an analysis of more recent events in the nineteenth and twentieth century.

The result of the French Revolution of 1789 has been a flitting between constitutional monarchy,[1] dictatorship[2] and various republics[3], as well as German occupation during the Second World War. The French Revolution was unique in that it, as Hague, Harrop and Breslin argue “swept away medieval structures of power and accelerated the creation of modern nation-states which dominate the contemporary world”. [4] It also helped to speed up major economic and political growth through removing the control that the aristocracy and church held over the peasantry, which in turn laid the groundwork for more representative, democratic government. However, France’s revolution was not a stable one. They also point out that “once the common enemy has been removed, the glue dissolves”[5], which helps to explain why the revolution didn’t result in stability and why France’s political system seems to swing between various forms of democracy, and authoritarian rule.

Charles De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic (1958 onwards) was an attempt to correct the weaknesses of the Third and Fourth Republics, as the executive and the National Assembly’s ability to get bogged down by petty squabbles left it both weak and unrepresentative. For example, in the twelve years of the Fourth Republic there were 25 different governments, as political infighting made it impossible to meter out any stable coalition, with the president spending much of his time trying to hold together the parliament. Wright claims the difficulty in parliament choosing a president meant that “they were seen as the creatures and prisoners of the members of parliament who had elected them and who, when choosing the president, had sought to avoid the election of a strong personality – a man who might prove a danger both to the privileges and prerogatives of parliament and to the republic itself”[6]. For example, it took Rene Cote, the last president of the Fourth Republic thirteen ballots in order to get elected, a waste of time and a battering to any political leader’s prestige. It is also put across that any “presidential power was exercised only so long as it was tolerated by parliament and the government”.[7]

These factors resulted in France’s inability to deal effectively with any major events, such as uprisings in Indochina (1954) and Algeria (1956). This is highlighted by Roskin who points out that people saw the Fourth Republic as “unable to settle the ghastly Algerian War”[8] and views that “if a premier was too effective, other politicians sometimes vote against him out of resentment”[9]. To prove this he cites Pierre Mendes’ dismissal from the National Assembly as being an example of jealousy over his success at dealing with the Indochina uprising. Williams proposes that as a result of all this infighting government even became unrepresentative, operating “with no reference to the general public”.[10]

On the other hand, Wright does highlight how the Fourth Republic Presidents did exercise more authority than their predecessors in the Third Republic, asserting that “both were always intimately involved in the delicate negotiations which preceded the formation of any new government and marshalling parliamentary support for that government once it presented itself to the Assembly for investiture.”[11] He also highlights that “a determined president could try to block proposals and wait for the ineluctable collapse of the ministry: the succeeding prime minister might prove more sympathetic or more pliable”,[12] but of course the time it would take to achieve this would be extremely detrimental.

America initially existed as a loose collection of colonies, principally in New England, in the North and the Southern states, with different rules and freedoms handed by the “motherland”, England. The United States formed following the War of Independence was a response to England taxing the colonies without any form of representation. It had difficulties trying to maintain the confederation, as these governments had previously existed alongside and independently of each other, with Alex De Tocqueville noticing that “each of them, having always had a separate existence and a government within its control, had created peculiar interests”. [13] The constitution had to recognise that the states individual control was the greatest priority, which De Tocqueville agreed with, noting that “social resources would be more wisely and judiciously employed, if the administration of the whole country were concentrated in one pair of hands. But the political advantages derived by the Americans from a system of decentralisation would make me prefer that to the opposite system”.[14] He also felt that America is right to allow states to rule but leave administering to a central authority.

On the other hand, the writers of the revised American Constitution in 1787 had to include a backbone of central government or the states would be paralysed. The peace resulting from independence highlighted the defects in the original 1781 legislation. The united state had disintegrated, leaving each colony to become an independent state, which left America not able to find “resources sufficient to stand up to the Indian tribes or to pay the interest on debts contracted during the War of Independence”.[15] As a result of these flaws the Union was given the exclusive rights of making war and peace, concluding commercial treaties, levying armies and equipping fleets, as well as maintaining currency and the post office.

The President of America is restricted domestically by congress. Hague, Harrop, and Breslin feel that “the president seeks to influence Congress but cannot dictate to it, Presidential power is in essence the power to persuade.” As mentioned earlier, in the Fourth Republic of France the president had similar difficulties, but to an even greater extent. On the other hand, Wright saw that the Fifth Republic allowed Charles Gaulle (and his successors) “to be above politics and politicians”[16] and control domestic policy. The president is seen as being more represented and because of the weakened position of the French Parliament, backed up by Roskin’s claim that ministers were “reduced to messenger boys”.[17] Although the American President is the most representative member of government he is weaker than France because of the strength of congress and the federal structure which exists in America.

The American constitution unlike the French one which has been revised frequently, has been almost set in stone, Roskin feels that “the Americans regard their Constitution with an almost religious awe, not to be touched in its basic provisions, the French…have seen constitutions come and go and are not adverse to rewriting the basic rules of their political game every few decades.”[18] However, there have been some minor changes, “from the New Deal onwards, the American public looked to the White House rather than Congress for political leadership.”[19] asserts Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, also pointing out how there was a change back towards Congress from the 1970s, a “reaction to the so-called ‘imperial’ presidency”[20] .

In many ways the democracies of America and France are similar, with both presidents being universally elected and them being able to choose the cabinet. However, there are marked differences partly as a result of their democratic founding, such as whether it was through uprising against and internal or external enemy and events which led to either a movement or shift in presidential influence, such as the Algerian crisis or the New Deal. On the other hand, there are other factors which could have as strong a bearing on how these democracies have existed, such as geography. The size of the nation could quite easily help to explain why federalism exists in the United States and not France. Similarly, America’s ability to stay politically stable may be because it has not been in such proximity with aggressive nations as France.

This essay was written by Jonathan McHugh in April 2004

---

[1] Louis XVI (1791-49) and the Bourbon Restoration (1815-71)

[2] Napoleon (1804-15) and Napoleon III (1852-71)

[3] First Republic (1792-1804), Second Republic (1848), Third Republic (1871-1940), Fourth Republic (1944-58), and Fifth Republic (from 1958)

[4] Hague, Rod; Harrop, Martin and Breslin, Shaun Comparative Government And Politics: An Introduction (Third Edition) (Macmillan, 1992), p76-7, p316

[5] Hague, Rod; Harrop, Martin and Breslin, Shaun Comparative Government And Politics: An Introduction (Third Edition) (Macmillan, 1992), p76-7

[6] Wright, Vincent The Government And Politics Of France (Hutchinson, 1984) p20-23

[7] Ibid. p22

[8] Roskin, Michael J Countries And Concepts: An Introduction To Comparative Government (Prentice-Hall, 1982), p91.

[9] Ibid., p91

[10] Williams Philip M The French Parliament (George Allen And Unwin, 1968) p114

[11] Wright, Vincent The Government And Politics Of France (Hutchinson, 1984) p22

[12] Ibid. p22

[13] Alexis De Tocqueville Democracy In America (Translated By Lawrence, George Edited By Mayer, J.P. Doubleday Anchor (originally 1840), 1969). P82, p93, p112, p113

[14] Roskin, Michael J Countries And Concepts: An Introduction To Comparative Government (Prentice-Hall, 1982). p93

[15] Ibid. p113

[16] Wright, Vincent The Government And Politics Of France (Hutchinson, 1984). p23

[17] Roskin, Michael J Countries And Concepts: An Introduction To Comparative Government (Prentice-Hall, 1982), p91, p93

[18] Ibid. p91

[19] Hague, Rod; Harrop, Martin and Breslin, Shaun Comparative Government And Politics: An Introduction (Third Edition) (Macmillan, 1992), p300

[20] Ibid. p300

Transitions to Democracy Notes

Transitions To Democracy
• Is it inevitable that all states will become democracies?
• What factors affect the form democracy finally takes in a state in transition?
• Is it inevitable that a state having become a democracy will remain one?

In order to deal with whether democracy is inevitable and whether it is permanent we need assess factors such as the transition into democracy, the military, as well as economic and social society.

The historical circumstances for revolution are unique to each country, being generally being controlled by:
• How the previous regime broke down
• The nature and duration of authoritarian rule
• How the ruler gained and maintained his legitimacy
• The confidence and competence of the ruler and opponents

A history of liberalism is an important factor in whether a country remains democratic or not. Ever since the French Revolution of 1789, France has been swaying between the desire for liberalism and representation and a strong leader to rule them. Although the Fifth Republic has appeared to have dealt with these apparent contradictions, the presidents emergency powers have the potential for dictatorship similar to Hitler’s assimilation of Germany in the Night of the Long Knives. The longer any period of liberalism the more it is likely that a coup would be met with violent oppoisition.

Many democracies, are started as a result of dictators slowly introducing liberalisation as a result of:
• During times of success
• A weariness of repression

In times of success dictators consider themselves to be in a position where they are able to encourage limited democracy, assuming they will be supported by the population

In weariness, normally from military defeat this is mainly intended as a token gesture.

However, both cases introduce a new factor to society. For a limited democracy there is a growth in individualism and opposition which may create a legitimacy deficit in the medium and long term, especially when people start questioning the role and legitimacy of the leaders.

Part of this extension of civil liberties is as a result of overconfidence of the dictator. This happened and resulted in the collapse of the Argentine military of 1973, Brazilian generals if 1974 and the Portuguese MFA of 1975 to name but a few.

In general, it is felt that if the dictator voluntarily introduced liberal aspects into society it may become easier to undo than if forced to do so by events, such as Czechoslovakia in the 1960s. However, it is at great cost and may take a considerable deal of repression to do so.


Historically, this is still more dangerous for the regime as it normally catalyses opposition which had been easier to put down previously.


The extent of military intervention is important as to whether or not a society can become and remain democratic.

As O’Donnell and Schmitter put it in Transitions From Authoritarian Rule “once the military has reached a minimal level of professionalism, only a severe rupture within it can open the way to a successful revolution”. If the weariness of repression is because of a war the level of militarism domestically may be lower, especially in an unsuccessful one, as most of the most professional forces are fighting elsewhere. This finally would allow for the potential of revolution or concessions which could permit transition as mentioned earlier.

Looking at the Franco regime the strong military was a factor for the collapse of democracy and his maintaining of power. However, by the time of transformation in the 1970s the armed forces had become merely one of several elements in what Juan Linz has called its “limited pluralism”, allowing democracy to come in and stabilise itself in Spain.

When the armed forces does not care for the authoritarian regime it becomes easier for it to have what O’Donnell and Schmitter described as a “hands off attitude to the transition, by declaring themselves concerned only with protecting their own institutional values of stability and autonomy, as well as public order”. This makes it easier for a democracy to establish itself and become stable.

On the other hand, if its involvement is extensive in society the institutional interests of the military cannot but be affected by emerging civilian authorities who may not be sympathetic to such considerations. This can be very dangerous to any democracy, as it will always raise the spectre of future military uprising.


Any democratic and liberal progress must be matched with economic development, as there needs to develop “complex sets of collective actors” to represent and stabilise various social classes.

One of the greatest problems facing any newly democratised countries is that they are highly vulnerable to the outside world economically. In general most authoritarian countries put controls on contact with the outside world both intellectually and economically. When the economic markets are finally opened up these previously underdeveloped economies have to immediately deal with an increasingly advanced and competitive world market. For example, following the collapse of the Soviet Block output fell dramatically for countries such as Poland and Russia until the mid nineties.

In authoritarian regimes there has been a tendency for civil society to decline as a result of physical and ideological repression, coupled with the fact that any participation would have existed in the state controlled public arena. The longer this occurred for the more dangerous it becomes, as Russia is still in a position where people for generations have been unable and now unused to creating societies and organisations independent of the state.

A weak economic system and civil society, such as experienced by many African countries will always find it difficult to maintain democracy in the threat of possible coups as people would be less likely to resist political change and less likely to succeed.

It is improbable that all societies will become democracies, especially at the same time. Underdeveloped societies will find it difficult to resist military rule just as it becomes harder for despots to maintain control over more complex demanding societies. There will always be events which will allow for small groups to assume control of states as well as groups of people to overthrow despots. It is dependent on how society, the military and the leader deals with these events.

These notes were collected by Jonathan McHugh in January 2004


Bibliography

Guillermo O’Donnell And Philippe Schmitter: Transitions From Authoritarian Rule (The John Hopkins University PressxqWSX, 1986)

Hague, Rod; Harrop, Martin and Breslin, Shaun Comparative Government And Politics: An Introduction (Third Edition) (Macmillan, 1992)

Wright, Vincent The Government And Politics Of France (Hutchinson, 1984)