A Comparison Between the Political Executives of France and Germany

France and Germany’s differing constitutions have resulted in their executives holding different emphasis on the role of the president and the prime minister and the power that they hold over the parliament. For example, Germany has a greater separation of powers, where the president is confined to state matters and the prime minister (chancellor) maintaining domestic policy. In France however, the president has significantly greater control, being both Head of State and with the most domestic control. Their relationships between the executive and parliament reflect how the leaders and cabinet are able to act. While both the French President and German Chancellor are able to choose the members of the cabinet, the German Chancellor has less control and has to keep one eye on parliament. Being elected by popular mandate, the French President does not have this problem and has the added influence of being able to choose the prime minister as well. On the other hand, similarities do exist. Both presidents have similar roles as Heads of State and they are looked to as spiritual leaders, or guardians of a national ideal. Constitutional checks can still reign in the French President.

The Fourth Republic of France was held hostage by a leaderless parliament. The executive and the National Assembly’s ability to get bogged down by petty squabbles left it both weak and unrepresentative. For example, in the twelve years of the Fourth Republic there were 25 different governments, as political infighting made it impossible to meter out any stable coalition, with the president spending much of his time trying to hold together the parliament. Wright claims the difficulty in parliament choosing a president meant that “they were seen as the creatures and prisoners of the members of parliament who had elected them and who, when choosing the president, had sought to avoid the election of a strong personality – a man who might prove a danger both to the privileges and prerogatives of parliament and to the republic itself”[1]. For example, it took Rene Cote, the last president of the Fourth Republic thirteen ballots in order to get elected, a waste of time and a battering to any political leader’s prestige. It is also put across that any “presidential power was exercised only so long as it was tolerated by parliament and the government”.[2]

The Weimar government of the 1920s and 1930s was Germany’s first attempt at democracy. There were a great deal of flaws which made it a highly unstable political environment. For example, majorities of opponents frequently combined their votes to remove an incumbent chancellor, creating the instability which eventually paved the way for extremist groups like the Nazis to gain support. In 1934 Hitler similarly took advantage of President von Hindenburg’s death to assert himself as Head of State. Hogwood backs up these claims, asserting that these experiences “served as a warning against the concentration of state power under a single leader.”[3]

The French solution to this political instability was to strengthen the presidency, resulting in an example of ‘semi presidential’ government, in which a “president with some executive powers”[4] works extensively with the prime minister to guide government policy. Hogwood feels that in the Fifth Republic electoral politics “came to be dominated by presidential rather than parliamentary election.”[5] The main reason for this level of control is because the president is directly elected by the people. This gives the leader a personal mandate, as “a direct election confers legitimacy on the president, giving the incumbent a sound basis of office.”[6] This is particularly so as the electoral process requires up to two rounds of elections, until a candidate receives a majority of the vote.

Germany’s constitution drafters were at pains to create both an assertive parliament and an assertive government. Their solution was to create Chancellor Democracy. Unlike France, both the President and the Chancellor are indirectly elected. The president is chosen by Electoral College, whilst the chancellor was picked from a majority coalition in the Bundestag. This is in order to “create a balanced and stable system of government in which the executive could not act arbitrarily as it had during the Third Reich.”[7] Although the chancellor was previously elected in that manner there were a number of important changes. Firstly, it was only possible to remove the chancellor if there was a majority agreeing his successor. What Hogwood describes as a ‘constructive vote of no confidence’ helps to avoid the possibility of a power vacuum. The cap on the German President being only allowed two terms of office has proved to be a leash on any politician from exerting his influence for too long. Similarly, another important development was the “clear demarcation of the executive”,[8] as the president has been confined to a merely ceremonial role as head of state.

Both the French and German President’s roles as Head of State are fairly similar and have had successes, both internationally and domestically. For example, the French and German Presidents have been vocal recently in their opposition to the Iraqi war. Domestically, they have similar success representing some form of ideal of the national spirit.

Wright claims that the French President is the “guardian of national interest, the leader of the nation, the physical embodiment of its traditions and its continuity and the guide to its future actions.” [9] For example, the French President, Jacques Chirac has been very vocal in removing religious clothing in the workplace.

Having to deal with the ghosts of Nazism and the unification of Germany in the 90s the German President has an even more critical task. Hogwood highlights this, claiming that “West German presidents took on the role of the guardian of the country’s conscious and morale, working particularly for the people’s moral rehabilitation from war guilt”.[10] Ironically though, she goes on to point out how this created friction with the East Germans. This is because the East Germans were taught that they were working class, and consequentially they were victims. West Germans’ demands for a similar process is often interpreted as “western triumphalism over the fall of the former GDR”,[11] causing great friction in the country.

The French President has significant control over parliamentary process. He has control over patronage, choosing both the prime minister and the members of the cabinet, effectively controlling the direction of the executive. The President also has powers to dissolve the National Assembly and oversee the calling of referendums. Hogwood feels that “as long as the president had a sympathetic majority in parliament, he could in practice appoint and dismiss parliament.”[12] This is backed up by Wright, who asserts that “prime ministers and ministers have been appointed and dismissed without consultation and prime ministerial advice and objections ignored.”[13] This is because he is elected by the people and does not hold any loyalties to parliament, which enables the president to avoid or break parliamentary deadlock more effectively. On the other hand, the French President still does have constitutional checks. For example, the ability to dissolve the National Assembly is only allowed once a year. Similarly, the constitutional checks which have increasingly been ignored by the presidents could easily be returned at any point from an aggressive parliament. The prime minister merely works for the president, attempting to negotiate his policies with the National Assembly.

The German Chancellor has the constitutional right to “determine the general lines of the government’s policy programme”.[14] Like the French President the German Chancellor is able to choose his cabinet and although he is unable to interfere with the ministers’ departments they can “have the upper hand in this balance of responsibilities, because they can reshuffle the cabinet to get their own way.”[15] Also, the executive can bypass the Bundestag’s scrutiny by using committees and the federal system. However, unlike France, Germany’s executive power comes from lower levels upwards. The chancellor is chosen from the majority coalition of parties, taking into account a wide array of German regions (many political parties are regional), and social and economic differences. He is also most likely to have a more conciliatory and encompassing position to have got elected as prime minister in the first place. As a result, unlike the French President when choosing the cabinet the German Chancellor has to keep one eye on the coalition, as his coalition may fall apart if he upsets even minor parties. Hogwood extends the chancellor’s situation, pointing out that when there are many parties involved in a coalition the chancellor “is more likely to take on the character of a co-ordinator rather than the director of government policy.”[16]

Historical events have resulted in the French and German executives appearing so different. As a result France’s executive is more dynamic, as the president is able to make decisions without the need to appease parliament. Germany’s executive is more considered, with most actions being done with the general support of the Bundestag. Consequentially, whereas France’s President leads government policy, Germany’s Chancellor, despite his great level of control can only merely guide it.

This essay was written by Jonathan McHugh in April 2004

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[1] Wright, Vincent The Government And Politics Of France (Hutchinson, 1984) p20-23

[2] Ibid. p22

[3] Hogwood, Patricia; Roberts, Geoffrey European Politics Today: Second Edition (Manchester University Press, 2003) p128

[4] Hogwood, Patricia; Roberts, Geoffrey European Politics Today: Second Edition (Manchester University Press, 2003) p127

[5] Ibid. p132

[6] Ibid. p134

[7] Ibid. p168

[8] Hogwood, Patricia; Roberts, Geoffrey European Politics Today: Second Edition (Manchester University Press, 2003) p127

[9] Wright, Vincent The Government And Politics Of France (Hutchinson, 1984) p28

[10] Hogwood, Patricia; Roberts, Geoffrey European Politics Today: Second Edition (Manchester University Press, 2003) p128

[11] Hogwood, Patricia; Roberts, Geoffrey European Politics Today: Second Edition (Manchester University Press, 2003) p129

[12] Ibid. p132

[13] Wright, Vincent The Government And Politics Of France (Hutchinson, 1984) p28

[14] Hogwood, Patricia; Roberts, Geoffrey European Politics Today: Second Edition (Manchester University Press, 2003) p137

[15] Hogwood, Patricia; Roberts, Geoffrey European Politics Today: Second Edition (Manchester University Press, 2003) p137

[16] Ibid. p141

How Do Their Attitudes Towards Founding And History Affect Different Democracies?

This essay aims to compare how democracies are affected from a revolutionary aspect, such as when democracies were founded and then from an evolutionary aspect, where events result in a shift in democratic structure. It will focus on France and the United States of America, two of the earliest modern democracies, which were created in the eighteenth century and greatly informed by their differing histories of political upheaval and revolution. In order to make these cases the nature of the uprisings in the eighteenth century, their alternative effects shall be looked at, as well an analysis of more recent events in the nineteenth and twentieth century.

The result of the French Revolution of 1789 has been a flitting between constitutional monarchy,[1] dictatorship[2] and various republics[3], as well as German occupation during the Second World War. The French Revolution was unique in that it, as Hague, Harrop and Breslin argue “swept away medieval structures of power and accelerated the creation of modern nation-states which dominate the contemporary world”. [4] It also helped to speed up major economic and political growth through removing the control that the aristocracy and church held over the peasantry, which in turn laid the groundwork for more representative, democratic government. However, France’s revolution was not a stable one. They also point out that “once the common enemy has been removed, the glue dissolves”[5], which helps to explain why the revolution didn’t result in stability and why France’s political system seems to swing between various forms of democracy, and authoritarian rule.

Charles De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic (1958 onwards) was an attempt to correct the weaknesses of the Third and Fourth Republics, as the executive and the National Assembly’s ability to get bogged down by petty squabbles left it both weak and unrepresentative. For example, in the twelve years of the Fourth Republic there were 25 different governments, as political infighting made it impossible to meter out any stable coalition, with the president spending much of his time trying to hold together the parliament. Wright claims the difficulty in parliament choosing a president meant that “they were seen as the creatures and prisoners of the members of parliament who had elected them and who, when choosing the president, had sought to avoid the election of a strong personality – a man who might prove a danger both to the privileges and prerogatives of parliament and to the republic itself”[6]. For example, it took Rene Cote, the last president of the Fourth Republic thirteen ballots in order to get elected, a waste of time and a battering to any political leader’s prestige. It is also put across that any “presidential power was exercised only so long as it was tolerated by parliament and the government”.[7]

These factors resulted in France’s inability to deal effectively with any major events, such as uprisings in Indochina (1954) and Algeria (1956). This is highlighted by Roskin who points out that people saw the Fourth Republic as “unable to settle the ghastly Algerian War”[8] and views that “if a premier was too effective, other politicians sometimes vote against him out of resentment”[9]. To prove this he cites Pierre Mendes’ dismissal from the National Assembly as being an example of jealousy over his success at dealing with the Indochina uprising. Williams proposes that as a result of all this infighting government even became unrepresentative, operating “with no reference to the general public”.[10]

On the other hand, Wright does highlight how the Fourth Republic Presidents did exercise more authority than their predecessors in the Third Republic, asserting that “both were always intimately involved in the delicate negotiations which preceded the formation of any new government and marshalling parliamentary support for that government once it presented itself to the Assembly for investiture.”[11] He also highlights that “a determined president could try to block proposals and wait for the ineluctable collapse of the ministry: the succeeding prime minister might prove more sympathetic or more pliable”,[12] but of course the time it would take to achieve this would be extremely detrimental.

America initially existed as a loose collection of colonies, principally in New England, in the North and the Southern states, with different rules and freedoms handed by the “motherland”, England. The United States formed following the War of Independence was a response to England taxing the colonies without any form of representation. It had difficulties trying to maintain the confederation, as these governments had previously existed alongside and independently of each other, with Alex De Tocqueville noticing that “each of them, having always had a separate existence and a government within its control, had created peculiar interests”. [13] The constitution had to recognise that the states individual control was the greatest priority, which De Tocqueville agreed with, noting that “social resources would be more wisely and judiciously employed, if the administration of the whole country were concentrated in one pair of hands. But the political advantages derived by the Americans from a system of decentralisation would make me prefer that to the opposite system”.[14] He also felt that America is right to allow states to rule but leave administering to a central authority.

On the other hand, the writers of the revised American Constitution in 1787 had to include a backbone of central government or the states would be paralysed. The peace resulting from independence highlighted the defects in the original 1781 legislation. The united state had disintegrated, leaving each colony to become an independent state, which left America not able to find “resources sufficient to stand up to the Indian tribes or to pay the interest on debts contracted during the War of Independence”.[15] As a result of these flaws the Union was given the exclusive rights of making war and peace, concluding commercial treaties, levying armies and equipping fleets, as well as maintaining currency and the post office.

The President of America is restricted domestically by congress. Hague, Harrop, and Breslin feel that “the president seeks to influence Congress but cannot dictate to it, Presidential power is in essence the power to persuade.” As mentioned earlier, in the Fourth Republic of France the president had similar difficulties, but to an even greater extent. On the other hand, Wright saw that the Fifth Republic allowed Charles Gaulle (and his successors) “to be above politics and politicians”[16] and control domestic policy. The president is seen as being more represented and because of the weakened position of the French Parliament, backed up by Roskin’s claim that ministers were “reduced to messenger boys”.[17] Although the American President is the most representative member of government he is weaker than France because of the strength of congress and the federal structure which exists in America.

The American constitution unlike the French one which has been revised frequently, has been almost set in stone, Roskin feels that “the Americans regard their Constitution with an almost religious awe, not to be touched in its basic provisions, the French…have seen constitutions come and go and are not adverse to rewriting the basic rules of their political game every few decades.”[18] However, there have been some minor changes, “from the New Deal onwards, the American public looked to the White House rather than Congress for political leadership.”[19] asserts Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, also pointing out how there was a change back towards Congress from the 1970s, a “reaction to the so-called ‘imperial’ presidency”[20] .

In many ways the democracies of America and France are similar, with both presidents being universally elected and them being able to choose the cabinet. However, there are marked differences partly as a result of their democratic founding, such as whether it was through uprising against and internal or external enemy and events which led to either a movement or shift in presidential influence, such as the Algerian crisis or the New Deal. On the other hand, there are other factors which could have as strong a bearing on how these democracies have existed, such as geography. The size of the nation could quite easily help to explain why federalism exists in the United States and not France. Similarly, America’s ability to stay politically stable may be because it has not been in such proximity with aggressive nations as France.

This essay was written by Jonathan McHugh in April 2004

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[1] Louis XVI (1791-49) and the Bourbon Restoration (1815-71)

[2] Napoleon (1804-15) and Napoleon III (1852-71)

[3] First Republic (1792-1804), Second Republic (1848), Third Republic (1871-1940), Fourth Republic (1944-58), and Fifth Republic (from 1958)

[4] Hague, Rod; Harrop, Martin and Breslin, Shaun Comparative Government And Politics: An Introduction (Third Edition) (Macmillan, 1992), p76-7, p316

[5] Hague, Rod; Harrop, Martin and Breslin, Shaun Comparative Government And Politics: An Introduction (Third Edition) (Macmillan, 1992), p76-7

[6] Wright, Vincent The Government And Politics Of France (Hutchinson, 1984) p20-23

[7] Ibid. p22

[8] Roskin, Michael J Countries And Concepts: An Introduction To Comparative Government (Prentice-Hall, 1982), p91.

[9] Ibid., p91

[10] Williams Philip M The French Parliament (George Allen And Unwin, 1968) p114

[11] Wright, Vincent The Government And Politics Of France (Hutchinson, 1984) p22

[12] Ibid. p22

[13] Alexis De Tocqueville Democracy In America (Translated By Lawrence, George Edited By Mayer, J.P. Doubleday Anchor (originally 1840), 1969). P82, p93, p112, p113

[14] Roskin, Michael J Countries And Concepts: An Introduction To Comparative Government (Prentice-Hall, 1982). p93

[15] Ibid. p113

[16] Wright, Vincent The Government And Politics Of France (Hutchinson, 1984). p23

[17] Roskin, Michael J Countries And Concepts: An Introduction To Comparative Government (Prentice-Hall, 1982), p91, p93

[18] Ibid. p91

[19] Hague, Rod; Harrop, Martin and Breslin, Shaun Comparative Government And Politics: An Introduction (Third Edition) (Macmillan, 1992), p300

[20] Ibid. p300